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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS IN
MINNESOTA*
By
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ORVILLE C. PETERSONf
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THE NOTICE OF CLAIMS ACT

HISTORY AND PRESENT PROVISIONS

A

PART from constitutional restrictions, the legislature may decide the extent to which the state and its subdivisions should
be subject to liability for the torts of their officers and agents. It
may clearly grant complete immunity, subject municipalities to the
same liability as that of private individuals under similar circunstances, or impose certain conditions on the performance of which
liability is made to depend."' - Its most important action of the
last type is the passage of an act requiring notice before certain

tort actions may be commenced. The basic section of the present
statute reads as follows :776
"Every person who claims damages from any city, village or

borough for or on account of any loss or injury sustained by
reason of any defect in any bridge, street, sidewalk, road, park.
ferry-boat, public works or any grounds or places whatsoever, or
by reason of the negligence of any of its officers, agents. servants
or employees, shall cause to be presented to the common council or
other governing body within thirty days after the alleged loss or
injury, a written notice, stating the time, place and circumstances
thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice
has been given; or if commenced within ten days thereafter, or
more than one year after the occurrence of the loss or injury."
This statute and its predecessors have been in effect in somewhat similar form ever since 1897. Like provisions in special

*Continued from 26

MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw
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775See Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, (1883) 30 Minn. 545, 16 N. W.
410; Black v. Board of County Commissioners, (1906) 97 Minn. 487, 107
N. W. 560; Schigley v. City of Waseca, (1908) 106 Minn. 94, 118 N. W.
259.
7761 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1831.
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charters antedate that time. 77 Laws of 1897, chapter 248, first
applied such a requirement for notice before suit and a relatively
brief limitation on actions arising out of tort caims to all cities,
villages, and boroughs in the state.7 s Somewhat modified in
form, it appeared in the Revised Laws of 1905,-l remaining in
that form until supplanted in 1913 by a new provision78 wlhich
is the present statute. About twenty-nine other states require that
notice of tort claims against municipal corporations be given
78
within certain fixed time limits. '
It will be noticed that the Minnesota law applies to all municipal corporations but not to counties, towns, and school districts. 8 The present statute and its predecessors have been held constitu77 7
For example, the Minneapolis special charter of 1881, Minnesota
Sp. Laws 1881, ch. 76, subch. 8, sec. 20, the St. Paul special charter of
1885, Minnesota Sp. Laws 1885, ch. 7, sec. 19, and the Mankato special
charter of 1881, Minnesota Sp. Laws 1881, ch. 73, subch. 8, sec. 8 contained
such provisions. These may have served as models for the general statewide legislation of 1897.
778Section 1, the only section here material, reads as follows: "Before
any city, village or borough in this state shall be liable to any person for
damages for, or on account of, any injury or loss alleged to have been
received or suffered by reason of any defect in any bridge, street, road. sidewalk, park, public ground, ferry boat, or public works of any kind in
said city, village or borough, or by reason of any alleged negligence of any
officer, agent, servant or employee of said city, village or borough, the
person so alleged to be injured, or some one in his behalf, shall give to the
city or village council, or trustees or other governing body of such city,
village or borough, within thirty days after the alleged injury, notice
thereof; and shall present his or their claim to compensation to such council
or governing body in writing, stating the time when, the place where and
the circumstances under which such alleged loss or injury occurred and
tfie amount of compensation or nature of relief demanded from the city,
village or borough, and such body shall have ten days' time within which
to decide upon the course it will pursue with relaton to such claim; and
no action shall be maintained until the expiration of such time on account
of such claim nor unless the same shall be commenced within one year after
the happening of such alleged injury or loss."
779
Sec. 768. This section was almost identical with the present statute.
It reads: "Every person who claims damages from any city, village or
borough for loss or injury sustained by reason of any defect in a street,
road, bridge or other public place, or by reason of negligence of its officers,
agents, or servants, shall cause to be presented to its council or other governing body within thirty days after the alleged loss or injury, a written
notice stating the time, place, and circumstances thereof, and of the
amount of compensation or other relief demanded. No action therefor shall
be maintained unless such notice has been given, or if commenced within
ten days thereafter, or more than one year after the occurrence of the
loss or injury."
78
OLaws 1913, ch. 391.
75
'National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report No. 60 (1940)
Tort Notice of Claim Statutes, p. 2.
7S2Bohrer v. Village of Inver Grove, (1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. W.
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tional7 3
It has superseded previous charter and special law
provisions in conflict with it.T1 The statute of 1897 (lid not prevent the subsequent adoption of a different home rule charter
provision on the subject ;785 but it is clear that the present statute
is virtually the exclusive law on the subject, applying to all home
rule charter cities as well as to other municipal corporations.78
2.

PURposE

\Vhen one individual negligently injures another, the wrongdoer ordinarily needs no notice of the accident and the claim for
damages that results, since he is well aware of the accident himself. To a somewhat less extent, this is also true of most private
corporations whose operations are more confined in area and
scope of functions than are those of municipal corporations. In
the case of the latter, particularly those of any size at all, many
accidents happen through their negligence of which they cannot
possibly be aware. In streets alone no reasonable inspection can
reveal all the defects which might cause accidents.7 7 Owing to
these circumstances-in addition, perhaps to a recognition of the
different light placed by many individuals upon actions against
individuals and those against governments-the statute requiring
notice of claim before actions based on negligent torts might be
brought was enacted.7 8 8 Its object is to "give the municipality an
183Winters v. City of Duluth, (1901) 82 Minn. 127, 84 N. W. 788:
Frasch v. City of New Ulm, (1915) 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. W. 121. See
Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, (1883) 30 Minn. 545, 16 N. W. 410.
Because of a title that was narrower than the body of the act, the 1897
statute was partially ineffective, Winters v. Duluth. supra this note;
but the defect was remedied by the 1905 revision. Mitchell v. Village of
Chisholm,
(1911) 116 Minn. 323, 133 N. W. 804.
784
Doyle v. City of Duluth, (1898) 74 Minn. 157, 76 N. W. 1029;
Nicol785v. City of St. Paul, (1900) 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. W. 375.
Peterson v. City of Red Wing, (1907) 101 Minn. 62, 111 N. \W.
840. "The subject of notice to a municipality of claims for damages by
reason of defects in its streets as a condition precedent to maintaining an
action therefor is germane to the subject of municipal legislation; hence
the provision of the home rule charter here in question is valid, and the
general law on the subject in force when the charter was adopted is not
applicable to this case."
7861 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1833; Johnson v. City of Duluth,
(1916) 133 Minn. 405, 158 N. W. 616. Notwithstanding this decision and
the statute, a charter provision requiring notice has since been construed
and applied. Szroka v. N. W. Bell Telephone Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 57,
213 N. W. 557.
78
7Duluth, for example, had 637.5 miles of streets in 1930 and St.
Louis Park with 4,811 population in 1930, had 282. (1938) 23 Minnesota
Municipalities 286, 321.
788
David, Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omissions (1936)
151. The purpose and policy of notice statutes, as stated in the cases, are

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS

opportunity to investigate and to protect against fictitious
claims.,"' Put more fully,
"The manifest object of such notice is to enable the nmicipality, by its governing body, promptly to investigate, or cause to be
investigated, the time, place, and circumstances of the injury,
while7 witnesses
were obtainable and facts fresh in their recollec90
tion."
If the notice is properly given, the municipal authorities have an
opportunity to settle the claim without suit if it be found after
investigation that the claim is a meritorious one; and if not they
can intelligently answer and defend any action brought to enforce
the claim.7 9' Hence, the essential criterion of a notice is whether
it gives the municipal corporation sufficient information within the
time allotted to permit its officials to make proper investigation to
determine the truth and the merit of the claim.7" - The requirement of notice is mandatory and a sufficient notice is a condition
precedent to recovery.'-- However, it is to be construed liberally
in favor of the person injured. 9
3.

CLAIMS TO WHICH STATUTE APPLIES

The notice of claims act does not mention utilities specifically,
.nor does it draw any distinction in language between actions
arising out of the performance of a governmental function for
which liability may be imposed (i.e., the maintenance of streets
and sewers) and those arising out of the operation of proprietary
enterprises. The court has held, however, that the statute applies
to the latter as- well as the former. 9 5 The court pointed out in
the case in which this principle was established that there is as
much need for notice in the case of claims arising out of utility
operations as in the case of other claims for which the municidiscussed in the report of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
on Tort
Notice of Claim Statutes, p. 306.
9
7S
Kelly v. City of Faribault, (1905) 95 Minn. 293, 104 N. W. 231.
9
7001cott v. City of St. Paul, (1904) 91 Minn. 207, 97 N. W. 879. A
number of other cases are to the same effect. See, for example, Kandelin v.
City of1 Ely, (1910) 110 Minn. 55, 124 N. W. 449.
7-92Wornecka v. City of St. Paul, (1912) 118 Minn. 207, 136 N. %V.561.
7 Larkin v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Minn. 311, 127 N. W.
1129; O'Brien v. City of St.Paul, (1911) 116 Minn. 249, 133 N. W. 981;
Wornecka v. City of St. Paul, (1912) 118 Minn. 207, 136 N. W. 561:
Weber v. City of Minneapolis, (1916) 132 Minn. 170, 156 N. W. 287.
-93Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, (1883) 30 Minn. 545, 16 N. W.
410; Harder v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. W. 350;
Bausher
v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. W. 745.
94
7 O1cott v. City of St. Paul, (1904) 91 Minn. 207, 97 N. W. 879;
Hampton v. City of Duluth, (1918) 140 Minn. 303, 168 N. W. 20.
795
Frasch v. City of New Uln, (1915) 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. W. 121.
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pality may be liable. ; 90 It further found that the statute does not
involve an arbitrary discrimination in favor of utilities which are
municipally-owned.
The present statute requires the serving of notice when the
cause of action arises out of one of two things: (1) defects in
streets or other public places; (2) negligence of the municipal
corporation's agents. 7 - The original statute of 1897 also covered
these general types of tort claims, but the title of the act was so
restrictive"'8 that the notice requirement was held to be inapplicable to claims arising out of negligence unconnected with
streets or other public places. 9 ' However, when the section was
carried over into the 1905 revision, this defect in title was
cured ;8"' and since that time the statute has been wholly in effect.
The- 1913 act supplanting the comparable sections of the Revised
Laws of 1905801 both as to negligence and as to defects in streets
and public places has been applied on numerous occasions. s10
The title to the 1897 act referred only to claims for personal
injuries.8 0 3 Hence it was held that the notice requirement did not
apply to claims for damages to property. 0 4 However, it was evident from an earlier decision that nothing more serious than
a defect in title prevented the broader application of the act. In
796"Every reason which calls for the service of a written notice of

claim upon a municipality before suit in any case, applies in this. It is as
important that the head or administrative body of a city have notice of
claim for negligent injury or damage caused by something connected with
its water system, as if the injury arose out of some negligent defect in its
streets. The funds of a city must be used to pay the one claim as well as
the other. The purpose of notice is to enable a city to ascertain the facts.
and keep in touch with the evidence pertaining to the claim, so as to
facilitate a just settlement, or, if that cannot be done, defend with effect.
The legislature, having deemed it expedient and conducive to public welfare to permit municipalities to own and manage public utilities, may to
a reasonable extent protect them against stale and long hidden demands.
and, perhaps unnecessary lawsuits, by requiring timely notice as a condition
precedent
to suit." Idem, (1915) 130 Minn. 41, 43. 153 N. W. 121.
97
7
See Johnson v. City of Duluth, (1916) 133 Minn. 405, 158 N. W.
616. 98
' "An act relating to actions against cities, villages or boroughs for
damages to persons injured on streets and other public grounds, by reason
of the negligence of any public officer, agent or employee of any city, village or
borough."
799Winters v. City of Duluth, (1901) 82 Minn. 127, 84 N. W. 788.
80
Mitchell v. Village of Chisholm, (1911) 116 Minn. 323, 133 N. W.
804. See also Diamond Iron Works v. City of Minneapolis, (1915) 129
Minn. 267, 152 N. W. 647.
80LMinnesota, Laws 1913, ch. 391, sec. 1 found in I Mason's 1927
Minn. Stats., sec. 1831. See the quotation in full, supra, pp. 224-225.
2
SO
See the cases cited infra this chapter.
503
See note 798, supra.
S04Megins v. City of Duluth. (1906) 97 Minn. 23. 106 N. W. 89.
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Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, °5 a similar provision in the special
charter of Minneapolis was held applicable to claims for property
damage. It was argued by the plaintiff that the phrase, "on account of any injuries received by any defect. .. " was limited by a
subsequent phrase, "and that the person so injured ... ;" but the
court said this was a strained construction, since the quoted phrase
was perfectly correct language to use in speaking of one injured
in his property- "No reason can be conceived," it added, "for any
difference in the rule in the two classes of cases, and the language
of the charter makes none."80 6 Following this argument, the
notice requirement of the Revised Laws of 190560- was held to
apply to property damage as well as to injuries to the person,80s
and the present statute has been similarly construed. The cause
of the damage, and not the kind of damage resulting, is the test
of whether notice is required. 0 9
On the other hand, not all kinds of damages to property-and
presumably not all kinds of personal injuries, although this point
has not been determined-are within the purview of the notice
statute. Where there is a direct invasion of the plaintiff's property,
negligence need not be an element of the tort; consequently in such
cases no notice is required. Thus in Bohrer v. Village of Inver
Grove,810 the village and school district filled in a natural ravine or

gully on the land of the school district with sand and dirt, so that
when rains came the sand and dirt washed down upon the plaintiff's adjoining property. The court held that the plaintiff was not
required to give notice of the claim before commencing action. In
this case not only was the claim not predicated upon negligence,
but the injury was not the result of 9nything done on the land of
the village.
An action to enjoin a municipal corporation from continuing
a nuisance need not be preceded by a notice of claim; the statute
apparently applies only to actions at law for damages.81' An
action for damages resulting from the maintenance of a nuisance
in which negligence is not a necessary element may also
so(1883) 30 Minn. 545, 16 N. W. 410.
806(1883) 30 Minn. 545, 547, 16 N. W. 410.
807Sec. 768.
sosDiamond Iron Works v. City of Minneapolis, (1915) 129 Minn.
267, 152 N. W. 647.
s 09 Hughes v. Village of Nashxwauk, (1927) 177 Minn. 547, 225 N. W.
898.
8110(1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. W. 721.
8
1Joyce v. Village of Janesville, (1916) 132 Minn. 121, 155 N. W. 1067.
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be maintained without serving the statutory notice. 82 In these
cases the nuisance consisted of casting sewage on the plaintiff's premises. The same rule does not apply to actions arising
out of "nuisances" maintained in the street, since such cases
clearly involve defects in the street or negligent maintenance of the
street withini the contemplation of the notice statute.
It would appear that in most cases of trespass to real property,
as in the nuisance cases where an objectionable substance is cast
on private property by the municpial corporation, there is likewise no requirement that a notice of claim be served before suit.
The suggestion in Bohrer v. Village of Iver Grove,813 in which
notice was held not required, that "the legal rights of the parties
may be worked out upon the theory of a trespass or a nuisance""'
indicates that this is true. On this theory, the plaintiff in a recent
case" sought to avoid the necessity of a notice, but he was unsuccessful, primarily because he pleaded negligence rather than
trespass, and secondarily, perhaps, because the alleged tort was
not in fact a trespass. The plaintiff in that case had a private
system for the distribution of water to the inhabitants of Lincoln
Township, part of which was incorporated as the village of
Mahtomedi. After incorporation, the village built its own system,
in the course of which, according to the plaintiff's complaint, it
"wrongfully. negligently, and carelessly prosecuted" the work "so
as to break, pull apart, and loosen the pipes of the plaintiff and
immediately upon completion of its installation covered all of said
pipes including the pipes of the plaintiff." Because of these
"wrongful, negligent, and careless acts," the plaintiff's mains and
pipes leaked so that he was "unable to serve his customers, and lie
sued for damages. The court decided the complaint sounded in
negligence and that there could be no recovery because notice had
not been given. The word "wrongfully," which the plaintiff insisted was sufficiently descriptive of trespass to distinguish it from
the terms "negligently and carelessly" which immediately followed,
was construed with the other words as claiming wrongful injury
based on negligence and carelessness. "In passing," the court said
in dictum, "it is very difficult to imagine, upon the facts of this
case, that the village, in building its own system of water supply,
Si2Nienow v. Village of Mapleton, (1919) 144 Minn. 60, 174 N. W.
517; Hughes v. Village of Nashwauk, (1929) 177 Minn. 547, 225 N. W. 898.
813(1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. W. 721.
814(1926) 166 Minn. 336. 338. 207 N. W. 721.
815Kuehn v. Village of Mahtomedi, (1940) 207 Minn. 518, 292 N. W.
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authorized under our statutes,8 1 G can be said to be a trespasser
upon its own streets."
Even where unlawful invasion of private property can be
considered as resulting from a defect in the street, as in some
cases of interferences with surface water, no notice is required.
The words in the statute have been construed to refer to
"defects in public ways or structures as such, and with regard
to their usefulness and safety for the purposes of travel. There is
nothing suggesting that the statute was intended to cover injuries resulting to adjacent property from conditions which do
not render the street or highway defective as such."817Actions for damages for taking or damaging private property for public use need not be preceded by notice. Thus no notice
is necessary in an action for damages resulting from grading a
street i8 or from changing the grade. 19
Until the passage of the 1913 act, the general notice statute
had no application to damage actions for death by wrongful
act as distinct from injuries.12 0 This was true both before"'- and
after8 2-2 the 1905 revision. The same construction had been made
of special charter provisions whose language was similar. 2 3 Even
if the death did not occur until after the last date on which notice
could legally be served had the action been for personal injuries,
the notice requirement was inapplicable. 24
The rule that the statute did not apply to wrongful death
actions was abrogated by express provision of the 1913 notice
statute. Section 3 of that act 25 made the general notice provisions
applicable when the claim was one for death by wrongful act
or omission, the notice to be given in such case by the personal
representative, surviving spouse or next of kin, or the consular
officer if the deceased was an alien, within one year after the
861
6Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1229.

8
'-Pye v. City of Mankato, (1888) 38 Minn. 536, 38 N. W. 621; Moran
v. City of St. Paul, (1893) 54 Minn. 279, 56 N. W. 80. In both these
cases, provisions of special charters were involved, but language is so
similar to that of the present general statute that the cases must be considered as determining the point with respect to 1 Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stats., sec. 1831 as well.
SSHirsch
v. City of St. Paul, (1912) 117 Minn. 476, 136 N. W. 269.
819
Johnson v. City of Duluth, (1916) 133 Minn. 405, 158 N. W. 616.
820
Maylone v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn. 406, 42 N. W. 88:
Orth v. Village of Belgrade, (1902) 87 Mfinn. 237, 91 N. W. 843; Senecal v.
City 821
of West St. Paul, (1910) 111 Minn. 253, 126 N. W. 826.
0rth v. Village of Belgrade, (1902) 87 Minn. 237, 91 N. W. 843.
s22Senecal v. City of West St. Paul, (1910) 111 Minn. 253, 126 N. V.
826. 823
Maylone v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn. 406, 42 N. W. 88.
82
4Orth v. Village of Belgrade, (1902)
87 'Minn. 237, 91 N. W. 843.
8251 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1832.
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alleged injury or loss resulting in death. However, if a notice
has been presented by the deceased within thirty clays after the
injury or loss which would have been sufficient if he had lived.
the notice requirement is considered complied with. The "provisions" of the notice statute which this section makes applicable
to wrongful death dctions are three: (1) notice must be given:
(2) action may not be commenced within ten clays immediately
after the injury; (3) the action must be commenced within one
year after the injury.826 Thus the action must be begun within the
same period within which the notice must be given. In this respect the 1913 notice statute prevails over the earlier general
provision of the wrongful death statute permitting the action to
21
be brought within two years.1
The 1913 act requiring notice of tort claims before suit
extended the notice requirement in one other particular. It had
been held that the law as it existed both before8 28 and after 38
the 1905 revision did not require notice where the defendant
municipal corporation was the employer of the plaintiff and the
injury occurred in the course of that employment. This was also
true of the requirement that action had to be commenced within
o:e year after the injury. 3 The 1913 law specifically stated,.'"
"The provisions of section 1 32- shall also apply when the claim
is based on the failure of the city. village or borough in one of
the duties assumed by or imposed upon it as a master or employer." However, the section now is of little importance, since
the workmen's compensation law provisions regarding notice to
the employer apply to claims of this kind against municipal corporation as well as those against private employers." The original
workmen's compensation act,8 34 passed at the same session as the
8 6

Kuhlman v. City of Fergus Falls, (1929)

653.

178 Minn. 489, 227 N. \V.

8s71bid.
8 8

2 Kelly v. City of Faribault, (1905)
95 Minn. 293, 104 N. W. 231:
Pesek v. City of New Prague, (1906) 97 Minn. 171, 106 N. W. 305.

820Gaughan v. City of St. Paul, (1912) 119 Minn. 63, 137 N. W.
199: Schultz v. City of St. Paul, (1913) 124 Minn. 257, 144 N. W. 955.
s3OQuackenbush v. Village of Slayton. (1913)
N. W. 716; Schultz v. City of St. Paul, (1913)

120 Minn. 373, 139
124 Minn. 257. 1,14

N. W.
955.
8
31Minnesota, Laws 1913, ch. 391, sec. 2, 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.,
sec. 1835.
8321 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1831.
8
33Written notice may be dispensed with if the employer has actual
notice. See State ex rel. Northfield v. District Court. (1915) 131 Min.
352, 155 N. W. 103.
8

s4Minnesota, Laws 1913, ch. 467.
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notice statute containing the provision regarding master and
servant claims, included its own notice requirement. 3 * Since
there is no longer any necessity for proving negligence in master
and servant cases s3G and since the liability of the employer prescribed by the workmen's compensation act is exclusive,"- there
appears to be little room left for the operation of the general
notice of claims statute in cases of "the failure of the city, village
or borough in one of the duties assumed by or imposed upon it
as a master or employer."
4.

DESCRIPTION

OF PLACE OF ACCUDENT

Since the notice of claim is not a pleading and is not to be construed according to the technical rules applicable to pleadings,"'
the place of the accident is sufficiently described if the proper
municipal officers may, by reasonable diligence, identify it.'"
When it conveys the necessary information to the proper person,
the notice is sufficient even though there are some inaccuracies
in it.84 ° On the other hand, the notice cannot describe one defect
and the complaint charge another entirely different one. s "
What is an adequate notice in respect to description of the
place of accident must, of course, be decided in each individual
case on the basis of the peculiar facts there involved; but a few
illustrations from the decisions may give some idea of the liberality of the court in interpreting the notice statute. In Harder v.
City of MVjinneapolis,s42 the notice said the injury occurred on
21st Street between 15th and 16th Avenues. Actually the accident happened between 15th and Bloomington; 21st Street was
not opened the additional block to 16th Avenue. The notice
was held sufficient since the officers, from the description given,
could easily tell the location. A notice that concluded with the
words, "that the place of my said accident was about seventy835Secs. 19, 20.
s3Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 64, sec. 1; 3 Mason's 1927 Min. Stats.
1940 Supp.,
sec. 4272-1.
s3 7Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 64, sec. 3; 3 .Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats..
1940 Supp., sec. 4272-3.
s 3sWeber v. City of Minneapolis, (1916) 132 Minn. 170, 156 N. W.

287; Hampton v. City of Duluth, (1918) 140 Minn. 303, 168 N. W. 20.

as9Harder v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. WV.350;
Lyons v. City of Red Wing, (1899) 76 Minn. 20, 78 N. WV.
868; O'Brien '.
City of St Paul, (1911) 116 Minn. 249, 133 N. WV. 981.
s4OHarder v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. W. 350.

s1Olcott v. City of St. Paul, (1904) 91 Minn. 207, 97 N. W. 879;

Hampton v. City of Duluth, (1918) 140 Minn. 303, 168 N. V. -20.
842(1889) 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. W. 350.
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three feet north of the fence on the north line of the property
of John Woodcock, adjoining said South Park street" was held
sufficient in another case. *3 A notice which described an accident
as happening about 147 feet from a corner when it actually
happened twenty feet from the spot described has also been held
adequate. 4 4 In Hebert v. Village of Hibbing,"4 ' the notice said
the accident occurred at a point on a sidewalk on a described portion of a street 200 feet west of a particular alley intersection.
Actually there was no alley. but there was a driveway, and there
was evidence that the accident happened 200 feet west of this
driveway. This was held sufficient.
The notice of injury given in Moran v. I'illage of Hibbing,""

mentioned the southeast instead of the northwest corner. but it
did make reference to the "corner between the end of the cement
sidewalk on the westerly side of Second avenue and Alice street.
which runs in an east and west direction." In holding that this
was sufficiently definite to satisfy the requirements of the statute,
the court agreed with the trial judge's statement that while the
mistake in the first reference to the place of the accident, given
in the notice of claim, might. standing alone, he fatal, the subse(ient description called attention to the right corner. Some reliance was also placed on the fact that the error in the notice did
not actually mislead the defendant, whose counsel had made
thorough preparation at the trial.
If the place of accident is insufficiently described in one
notice, but a simultaneously-served notice of a claim arising out
of the same accident describes the place sufficiently, the first
notice will also be regarded as sufficient. In such a case the two
notices should be read together. 4
5.

DESCRIPTION

OF

DEFECT

The same liberal construction of notices of claims has been
adopted with respect to the description of the defect or act of
negligence which occasioned the injury. Occasionally notices have

been held insufficient, although this is comparatively unusual. In
Hampton v. City of Diuluth,"'' the court found a notice fatally

defective which described a smooth and slippery ice condition at
8

13Lyons v. City of Red Wing, (1889) 76 Minn. 20, 78 N. XV. 868.
s440'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1911) 116 Minn. 249. 133 N. W. 981.
845(1927) 170 Minn. 211, 212 N. W. 186.
846(1928) 173 Minn. 458, 217 N. W. 495.
847
Boyd v. City of Duluth. (1925) 164 Minn. 63. 204 N. W. 562.
848(1918) 140 Minn. 303, 168 N. W. 20.
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one point when what actually caused the accident was a rough
and uneven condition more than twenty-five feet westerly. Similarly, in Olcott v. City of St. Paidls 9 where the complaint alleged
the accident was due to a hole in an allegedly defective sidewalk,
a notice of claim was held insufficient which did not mention the
unsafe character of the sidewalk, but alleged by way of inducement that the accident occurred "while plaintiff was lawfully
passing over the said sidewalk at the place mentioned, in consequence of the defective, slippery, icy, smooth, and unsafe condition of said sidewalk.... ." The court found nothing in this notice
that would direct the attention of the city officials to the material
and essential grounds upon which recovery was sought. "If we
could sustain the complaint, and the evidence to support the
same, upon such a notice, we need give no effect whatever to the
requirements that the circumstance of the injury should be set
forth." 850 Yet the fact that the court has several times had occasion to distinguish the notice in the Olcolt Case in order to hold
other notices sufficient suggests that it may have been unnecessarily strict in that case in what virtually amounted to the application of rules of pleading to a notice of claim.65' Ordinarily the
results have been more .favorable to the plaintiff. In Larkin v.
City of Minneapolis,8 12 for example, a notice was found to comply with the statute when it stated,
"that said injuries were caused at said place through carelessness and negligence of said city in failing to maintain and construct in a safe and proper manner the sidewalk crossing said
alley -at said place, and in failing to remove therefrom the ice
and snow which has accumulated and become bumpy, slanting.
and slippery, whereby the undersigned while traveling on said
sidewalk on said 5th Street was caused to fall."
The court pointed out that the notice informed the city of two
conditions: an accumulation of ice and snow and a defective side-walk. Even though the plaintiff could not have recovered for the
first, the notice was sufficient to lead the city officials to the
second. -Inanother case, 853 a notice charging a "patch of ice"
was held a sufficient designation of the circumstances to admit
S49(1904) 91 Minn. 207, 97 N. W. 879.
950(1904) 91 Minn. 207, 210, 97 N. W. 879.
85
'See Kandelin i%City of Ely, (1910) 110 Minn. 55, 124 N. W. 449;
Larkin v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Ifinn. 311, 127 N. W. 1129;
Weber v. City of Minneapolis, (1916) 132 Minn. 170, 156 N. W. 287.
852(1910) 112 Minn. 311, 127 N. W. 1129.
S53Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 138 Minn. 350, 165 N. W.
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proof of "an uneven ridge of ice," the defect alleged in the
complaint.
The decision in Goar v. Village of Stephen" 4 shows how

little will satisfy the statutory requirements when the preparation
of a more adequate notice would require technical knowledge
which the plaintiff, or even his attorney, could not be expected to
have. The plaintiff had been badly burned while ironing when
high voltage from the village's electric distribution system somehow reached her hand. The notice stated that electricity of a
dangerously high voltage entered the plaintiff's house and caused
the injuries and
"that said injuries were caused ...as the natural consequence
of . . . some defect in the wiring system and equipmlent" 1)y

reason of the negligence of the village "in the care, operatioll
and control of said system. .. "
The notice was held sufficient. Otherwise, the court pointed out,
it might be necessary for the plaintiff to employ an electrical engineer or other expert to examine an entire municipal system before she could give the notice which was a condition precedent to
her right to recovery.
Since the notice is intended to give the municipal authorities
sufficient information to enable them to investigate the claim, it
has been suggested that the plaintiff might be precluded from
recovery notwithstanding service of an adequate notice if his
wilful acts deprived the defendant of the benefit of the notice.
In T'Vornecka v. City of St. Paul,8 5'' the attorney for the plaintiff.
shortly after the accident out of which the action arose, took the
defective plank which allegedly caused it, replaced it with a good
plank, and then served the statutory notice. Tle court held that
whether the defendant was deprived of the protection of the
statute was a fact question and upheld the trial court's action in
granting the defendant's motion for a new trial. 850

6.

STATEMENT

OF TuIME OF ACCIDENT

The requirement that the notice state the time of the injury
appears to have been construed only once. In Murphy v. City
of St. Paul, 57 it was held that as against a demurrer, a statement
854(1923) 157 Minn. 228, 196 N. W. 171.
855(1912) 118 Minn. 207, 136 N. W. 561.
856There
had notice of
the plaintiff's
85'(1915)

was some evidence that the sidewalk inspector of the city
the accident and examined the place where it occtrred before
attorney removed the loose plank.
130 Minn. 410, 153 N. W. 619.
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in a notice that the accident occurred December 23 when it
happened December 24th was sufficient.
7.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

It has been held that the amount stated in the notice as the
amount claimed is not necessarily the maximum amount that the
plaintiff may recover. Since the object of the statute requiring
notice is to furnish information to municipal officials of the happening of the accident and that a claim is to be made, the situation should be considered analogous to the case where an attorney
presents a bill to his client for services rendered and then sues
for more when the client refuses to pay. This rule, the court
held, should apply in all cases where a specific claim is made for
unliquidated damages.8 58
The 1897 notice statute required that the notice state "the
amount of compensation or the nature of the relief demanded.
S. ., One notice, after charging the injury, stated that the
person injured would claim damages and the plaintiff contended
this met the requirement of the statute in giving "the nature of
the relief demanded." The court held, however, that the quoted
phrase was not intended to apply to such a case as this but only
to cases where some other relief than money compensation was
demanded. The plaintiff's notice was held deficient, therefore.
'6 0
in not stating "the amount of compensation ...demanded."
In Ackeret v. City of Miniwapolis,861 a parent claimed damages for an injury to his son, both on his own account and as
the statutory representative of his son. The court held that a
notice of claim was sufficient in that case if it contained the
essential information required by the statute even though it
failed to state specifically that the parent would claim damages
both for himself and for his son and failed to state the opportionment between the two of the amount named as the total demanded.
S. SERVICE OF NOTICE
The statute requires the notice to be presented to the council
or other governing body, but how it must be given and the claim
S5STerryll
v. City of Faribault, (1901) 84 Minn. 341, 87 N. W. 917.
9
s5 Minnesota, Laws 1897, ch. 248, sec. 1.
860
Bausher v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. V. 745.
It may be noted that the present statute is less open to the interpretation
for which the plaintiff contended in the Bausher Case since it requires
statement of "the amount of compensation or other relief demanded." I

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1831.
861(1915) 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976.
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presented to the council is not prescribed. The court has held that
it must be done in some practical and effective way, and that in
determining the sufficiency of the method adopted in any particular
case, technical strictness will not be required. A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is necessary.86 2
A notice may be served upon the officer who is custodian of
the records and files of the council; but to be effective as notice
to the council in such cases, the notice must be served on that
officer at his office or place of transacting the official business pertaining to his office." ' -' In villages generally this is the recorder or
clerk. 64 Apparently the notice may be presented at a council
meeting;s6 but if it is served on the clerk of the council, it is
immaterial so far as the plaintiff's right to recovery is concerned,
whether or not the clerk presented it to the council.80 In Minneapolis, notice served upon the assistant city clerk in the absence of
the clerk has been upheld.

6 7

What effect should be given to service on a member of the
council who has no secretarial duties for the council appears
never to have been specifically determined, although one case
seems to indicate that this is not a satisfactory method of service.
It was held in Doyle v. City of Duluth,86 8 that service on the
mayor was not sufficient ;s"' and more recently the same principle
862 Roberts v. Village of St. James, (1899) 76 Minn. 456, 79 N. W. 519.
s63See Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W.
615. In other states service on the clerk has been held sufficient when the
notice has been handed to him when he was not on duty or in his office.
King v. City of Parson, (1915) 95 Kan. 654, 149 Pac. 699; Wolf v. City of
Venice, (1910) 152 Ill. App. 585; Richmond v. City of Marseilles, (1914)
190 Ill.
864 App. 227.
Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W.
615. In Bausher v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. W. 745,
the court conceded without deciding that the city clerk of St. Paul was the
ex officio clerk of that city and keeper of the council records. Doubtless this
is true under the home rule charters of most cities.
s6rSee Doyle v. City of Duluth, (1898) 74 Minn. 157, 76 N. W. 1029;
Lyons6 v. City of Red Wing, (1899) 76 Minn. 20, 78 N. W. 868.
8 Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W. 615.

An earlier case, Doyle v. City of Duluth, (1898) 74 Minn. 157, 76 N. W.
1029, had suggested that when the notice is served in this way, a request
should be annexed that it be laid before the council at its next meeting;
but in Roberts v. Village of St. James, (1899) 76 Minn. 456, 79 N. W.
519, this was specifically held immaterial because, since the notice is
directed to the council, it is the duty of the clerk to lay it before the
council at its next meeting whether or not a request to do so is made.
Otherwise all that would be necessary to avoid recovery would be for
the council
to refrain from meeting until 30 days after the injury.
86
7Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, (1899) 77 Minn. 76, 79 N. W. 653.
868(1898) 74 Minn. 157, 76 N. W. 1029.
56
9See also Nicol v. City of St. Paul, (1900) 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. AV.
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has been applied to cities where the mayor is a member of the
council and has the same vote as other members.870 This seemed
like too technical a construction to two members of the court,
particularly in a case where the mayor had turned the notice
over to the corporation counsel, but it remains the law. Logically
the rule of that case should apply where service is made on any
member of the council other than the clerk in municipalities where
the clerk is a member of the council.
It has been held that service need not be made on a park
board even when the injury out of which the claim arises occurs
in a park under the jurisdiction of such a board.8 7 Presumably
this is true also of an accident occurring through negligence in
the operation of a municipal utility under the exclusive control
of a utilities commission.
Technical defects in the service of the notice, as in the case
of insufficiencies in other respects, usually have been held immaterial. A notice otherwise regular but signed with the wrong
initials-those of the plaintiff's husband-has been held valid,
since it was not apparent how the defendant could have been
prejudiced by the mistake.87 -2 An error in the address to which
the notice is directed is not significant if the notice is actually
served on the proper person. 7 3 Service of a copy of the notice has
been held as valid as service of the original.87 4
9.

ExcusE FOR NONCOTfPLIANCE

Some of the requirements for notice of tort claims which were
included in special charters made an exception to the notice requirement when the person injured was "bereft of reason by
virtue of the accident." 7 5 None of the general statutes have contained any exception in favor of either insane persons, minors,
or others; and it is evident that the court will not read such exceptions into the statute. It specifically has refused to exempt
minors from the notice requirement of the Minneapolis charter,
80

908.

7 Aronson v. City of St. Paul, (1934) 193 Minn. 34, 957 N. NV. 662.
s7KlYeopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1903) 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. IV.
8

72Terryll v. City of Faribault, (1900) 81 Min. 519, 84 N. W. 458.

873johmson v. City of St. Paul, (1893) 52 Minn. 364, 54 N. W. 735.
8 4
v. City of Minneapolis, (1899) 77 Minn. 76, 79 N. W. 653.
87'5Kelly
See Ray v. City of St. Paul, (1890) 44 Minn. 340, 46 N. W. 675;
Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 57. 213
N. W. 557. Many home rule charters contain such a provision. In Ray v.

City of St. Paul the injured person was held not to have been bereft of
his reason because of the accident; although morphine wvas administered
to relieve his pain, he was found to be in command of his mental faculties.
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although the charter provision did except persons bereft of their
reason because of the injury. Whether there should be other exceptions the court considered a matter of legislative policy. 7' The
great majority of the courts hold that the municipal corporation
may not waive the notice as required by the statute, 8 1 but this
question is still undecided in Minnesota. There is no exception.
as there is in the workmen's compensation act,878 where the
municipal corporation has actual knowledge of the injury; and
the supreme court recently has ruled that actual notice of the
accident and the facts concerning it does not excuse non-compliance with the notice of claims statute, since this notice is a
condition precedent to suit.s8" In this case a police officer who
saw the accident filed a report showing he had investigated it and
stating the facts and circumstances. A copy of this report, which
gave all the information required by the statute except a statement of the amount of compensation demanded, was served on the
city. This was held insufficient. In that case, the city had had the
plaintiff questioned and had received from her a written statement
setting forth her version of the facts, but the court found that
this did not operate to avoid the necessity of a proper notice. In
these circumstances, the court refused to uphold the notice upon
the ground either of estoppel or of waiver.

K.

STATUTES

G VERNING PRRESENTATION,
.\LLOWANCE

1.

APPLICATION

OF

AUtITING, AND

CLAIMS

TO TORT CLAIMS

Persons who have claims against counties, towns, school districts, and cities and villages generally are required to submit
them to the board or council before they may be allowed. A
formal procedure of presentation in verified form, consideration,
and allowance by the board or council is necessary before the
claims can be paid. ' " The statute relating to villages has been
s 76Szroka v. X. W. Bell Telephone Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 57. 213
N. W.77 557.
S National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report No. 60. Tort
Notice
of Claim Statutes, (1940) pp. 11-14.
87
8See I Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 4280.
87
901son v. City of Virginia, (Minn. 1941) 300 N. W. 42.
8801 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sees. 646. 668, par. 1, counties: 3
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 2849-2, school districts; I
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., Sees. 1105, 1106, towns; idem, secs. 1222, 1223,
villages; idem, secs. 766-769, municipalities. School districts are not ineluded in the term municipalities as used in the last-cited law, but towns
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held inapplicable to tort claims.88 ' Taking the language of the
section as a whole, the court construed the section as making the
village council a board of audit and not a tribunal to assess
damages; the section was intended to apply "only to claims of a
charter usually susceptible of being itemized," and was never
intended to embrace damage suits upon unliquidated tort demands 51 A similar construction was made of a city charter provision
upon somewhat different grounds. A special law charter of the
city of Austin provided for presenting "accounts, claims or demands of every kind whatsoever" to the council before suit. It
also provided for the service of a notice of tort claim before suit,
a provision similar to the general statute now in force. On the
ground that it could hardly be presumed that claims should be
presented twice, the court construed the first provision as referring only to claims in contract, not those in tort."'3 It appears
fairly well established from these cases that in any case where
the general notice of claim statute s"' applies, it is unnecessary to
comply with the usual procedure of presenting claims applicable to
contract claims; and in villages, ss there is no necessity for complying with the presentation of claims provision in tort cases even
in instances where the general notice requirement is inapplicable.
However, since the decision in Manso. v. Village of Chishli,
turned largely on the language of the .particular statute involved.
it is doubtful that it can be cited as a precedent on the latter point
except in the case of villages. Consequently. the applicability to
tort claims not covered by the notice statute of city charter provisions or statutes relating to cities which require presentation of
claims to the council before suit is an open question in any
and counties are. Olson v. Independent and Cons. School District No. 50,
(1928) 175 Minn. 201, 220 N. W. 606. They are, however, specifically
covered by the later enactment which became 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.,
1940 Supp., sec. 2849-2. No effort has been made to gather the provisions
of home rule charters or statutes relating to cities; but it is safe to say
from casual search that similar requirements are quite uniformly imposed.
This is an appropriate subject for inclusion in a home rule charter. State
ex rel. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. District Court, (1903) 90 Minn.
457, 97 N. W. 132.
SSManson v. Village of Chisholm, (1919) 142 Minn. 94, 170 N. W. 924.

ss2The court found that the history of the statute confirmed its view.

83
Clark v. City of Austin, (1888) 38 Minn. 487, 38 N. W. 615.
ss1.e. 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1831.
5
ss Sec. 1222, the section previously cited, has been construed as applying
both to villages operating under the Revised Laws of 1905 and to those
operating under Laws of 1885, ch. 145. First National Bank v. Village of
Buhl, (1922) 151 Minn. 206, 186 N. W. 306.
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particular case; much is likely to depend on the language used in
each instance.
The applicability of the provision relating to towns to tort
actions also never has been satisfactorily determined. The
statute""' provides that
"no action upon any claim or cause of action for which a
money judgment only is demandable, except upon town orders,
bonds, coupons, or written promises to pay money, shall be maintained against any town, unless a statement of such claim shall
have been filed with the town clerk. No action shall be brought
upon any town order until the expiration of thirty days after
payment thereof has been demanded."
In an action to recover damages from a town for unreasonably
casting surface waters on plaintiff's land, the court held that an
objection that there had been a failure to comply with this requirement of the statute had not been raised by the answer and therefore
could not be considered;887 but in the course of the opinion, the
court said obiter dictum:
"There is force in the contention that the legislature, by requiring all claims against towns to be filed with the town clerk
as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action thereon,
intended something more than a mere formality, and that, if the
statute is to serve any useful purpose, it should be construed to
suspend the right of action for a reasonable timie after the claim
is filed to permit the board of supervisors to inquire into and
allow or disallow the same." 8 88
The necessity for compliance with statutes requiring the presentation of claims against the county and school district in tort cases
also has not been determined. There is no broad prohibition of
suit before presentation and no requirement of the lapse of a
minimum time as in the case of towns, but it has been held that,
at least as to contract claims, filing of the claims is a condition
precedent to suit.18 Consequently, the provisions relating to towns,
counties, and school districts are probably all to be construed
alike. There is a dictum in a federal case that these statutes do
not relate to tort claims, 9 ° and the Minnesota court has held that
they have no application to a claim fixed by law.88 '
Mason 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 1106; see also idem, sec. 766.
Halvorson v. Town of Moranville, (1917) 137 Minn. 349, 163 N. W.

8861
887

673.

888(1917) 137 Minn. 349, 351, 163 N. W. 673.
88

9Board of County Commissioners v. Clapp, (1901) 83 Minn. 512,
86 N. W. 775; see Old Second National Bank v. Town of Middletown,
(1896)
67 Minn. 1, 69 N. W. 471.
8 0
9 City of Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1905) 142 Fed. 329.
ss"City of Fergus Falls v. Board of County Commissioners, (1903) 88
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The cases in other jurisdictions appear divided and so much
depends upon the language used in the statute that they are of
little help in Minnesota. " 2 While the same considerations do not
apply to the presentation of tort claims as to others, some purpose
would be served 93 by requiring tort claims to be presented before
suit; but the application of the statutes to such situations, except
in the case of villages, must still be considered undetermined.
2.

POWER TO COMPROMISE CLAIMS

Courts have differed somewhat in their views toward the
power of municipalities to compromise claims against them in the
absence of specific statutory authority. A power to compromise has
generally been implied where there is liability and the amount
remains unliquidated, but it has frequently been denied when
liability has not been definitely established.8 94 Our court has
taken a somewhat more liberal view. In Snyder v. City of St.
Paid,95 the court permitted the city of St. Paul, in the absence of
specific charter authority, to compromise a salary claim. The court
explained:
"It is a generally accepted doctrine that a municipality may,
unless forbidden by statute or charter, compromise claims against
it without specific express authority, such power being implied
from its capacity to sue and be sued, and that ordinarily power
to compromise claims is inherent in the common council as a
representative of the municipality. If it makes such compromises
in good faith and not as a gift in the guise of a compromise, the

settlement is valid and does not depend upon the ultimate decision that might have been made by a court for or against the
validity of the claim." 8 96
It has been held that a compromise may be made at any time
until final judgment; but a city may not compromise a claim which
Minn. 346, 93 N. W. 126. "In such case the county commissioners have no

right to interfere, and no power to pass upon the liability or nonliability
of the county, for the lav fixes the liability as well as the amount thereof.
...There is nothing for the commissioners to pass upon"' idem, p. 348.
92
s See 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), sec.
2629. See also the early case of Murphy v. County Commissioners of Steele
County, (1869) 14 Minn. 67. A contract claim was there involved, but some

of the lan.guage and the reference to a New York case may be of interest

in this connection.
893
As in the case of the tort notice of claims statute relating to cities
and villages.
94
S David, Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omissions, (1936).
238-239; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), sec. 2643.
895(1936) 197 Minn. 308, 267 N. W. 249.
s9(1936) 197 Minn. 308, 309, 267 N. W. 249.
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has gone to judgment unless the debtor is unable to pay in full.8"9

In both of these cases, contract claims were involved, but no good
reason occurs why the same thing is not true of tort claims.
The statement in the Snyder Case that the council must make
compromises in good faith and not as a gift in the guise of a
compromise suggests that a municipality may have no power to
compromise a tort claim as to which the recognized principles
make it clear that there is no liability. Thus, there probably is no
power to compromise a claim arising out of negligence occurring
in the exercise of a governmental function or a claim arising out of
an injury due to a street defect when no notice has been served
and the thirty-day period within which it might be served has
expired."" 8 Probably it has been a recognition of this fact that has
led to the passage of bills in the legislature, special in their effect.
authorizing payment of claims on which there could be no liability

as a matter of law. 99
General statutes relating to municipal corporations and quasi
municipal corporations in Minnesota contain no specific authorization or prohibition of the compromise of claimsY00 A number of
home rule charters, however, do place some restriction on the
making of compromises, usually by requiring a two-thirds or a

three-fourths vote of the council to effect such a settlement of a
claim.90' Recent statutes authorizing the indemnification of public
8

97Oakman v. City of Eveleth, (1925) 163 Minn. 100, 203 N. W. 514.
Here 98again, if a compromise is made, it must be made in good faith. Ibid.
The attorney general once reached this conclusion as to the latter
situation. Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 1922, No. 50. I-Ie relied upon Van Auken v.
City of Adrian, (1904) 135 Mich. 534, 98 N. W. 15. See People v. Parker,
(1907) 231 Ill. 478, 83 N. E. 282; City of Cincinnati v. Rogers, (1922)
16 Ohio App. 139. It is clear from the Snyder Case, however, that it does
not have to be definitely determined that there is a liability before a compromise is justified; and a mere error of judgment made in good faith
will not defeat such a compromise.
8
99See, for example, Minnesota, Laws 1937, chs. 357, 422, 424 Miinnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 201; Minnesota, Laws 1925, ch. 310; Minnesota,
Laws 1923, ch. 306. Many of these laws if challenged would probably be
found unconstitutional as special legislation. Cf. Szroka v. Northwestern
Bell 90Telephone Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 57, 213 N. W. 557.
OAside from possible authority granted to counties by I Mason's 1927
Minn. Stats., sec. 668, par. I which empowers the county board to "examine,
settle and allow all accounts, demands, and causes of action against the
same, and, when so settled, to issue county orders therefor. as provided by
law."901
Ada, (1908) secs. 85, 86; Alexandria, (1909) sees. 69, 70; Bemidji
(1905) ch. IV, sec. 21; Detroit Lakes, (1903) sees. 77, 78; Fergus Falls.
(1903) sees. 85, 86; Moorhead, (1900) sees. 86, 87; Staples, (1908) sees.
76, 77; West St. Paul, (1917) ch. IV, sec. 32: Willmar, (1901) sees. 82,
83; Windom, (1920) secs. 82, 83. A few require only a simple majority,
either of those present, like Jackson, (1920) sees. 81, 82; St. James,
(1918) sees. 76, 77; and Worthington, (1909) sees. 78, 79, or of the
members-elect, like St. Paul, (1914) sec. 133, pars. 2, 3.
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eniployees for mo.tor vehicle torts have contained express provision authoriziiig" te compromise of such claims, whether groundless or not.9 2
L.

STATUTES

PROVIDING FOR THE DIRECT AssumPTrxO
OF LIABILITY

1.

STATUTES PROVIDING FOB PAYMENT OF SPECIFIC CLAIMS
AGAINST THE STATE

Because of the firmly established principle of sovereign immunity from suit, one who has been injured in his person or
property by wrongful acts or omissions of state officers or employees generally has been without any remedy except the political
one of appealing to the legislature. Statutes paying claims of
aggrieved individuals have been passed since early statehood;
but tort claims authorized to be paid have been steadily increasing in number." 3 Acts authorizing payment of various types of
claims against the state, both contract and tort, have been passed
at virtually every session of the legislature since the state was
0
,
9rganized.
9O2Minnesota, Laws 1935, chs. 15, 173, Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 149
found in 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sees. 2780-17b, c. d,
3139-3, 4, 5, and 1933-67. These statutes are discussed in part M, infra.
903A search of the session laws of ten year intervals shows that no
tort claims were authorized by the legislatures of 1859, 1869, and 1879, and
none in 1889 except one claim for loss suffered by a prison guard due to a
prison fire. In 1899, payment of three tort claims by third persons and one
by a state employee was authorized. The 1909 legislature authorized payment of eight claims by workmen (including National Guardsmen) but
none where the injured person was not employed by the state. The 1919
legislature had a similar record with 27 claims by workmen authorized
to be paid. In 1929, however, the legislature authorized payment of 25
tort claims in addition to 11 claims for employees' injuries; and in 1939
about 63 tort claims were paid or suit against the state was authorized
upon them, -four injuries to employees also being deemed compensable.
These figureiare only approximately correct, because the information given
in the claims acts is too meagre in some instances to permit an accurate
of the claims paid.
classification
90
4Those passed during the 1900's include: Minnesota, Laws 1901, chs.
311, 381, sec. 6; Laws 1903, ch. 285, sec. 5; Laws 1905, ch. 337, sec. 18;
Laws 1907, ch. 476, sec. 32; Laws 1909, ch. 375, sec. 41; Laws 1911, ch.
280, sec. 13; Laws 1913, ch. 583, sec. 15; Laws 1915, cl. 377; Laws 1917,
ch. 439; Laws 1919, ch. 464; Laws 1921, ch. 512; Laws 1923, ch. 445; Laws
1925, ch. 425; Laws 1927, cbs. 384, 442; Laws '1929, chs. 393, 394, 427;
Laws 1931, ch. 416; Laws 1933, ch. 390, 427; Laws 1935, ch. 392; Laws
1937, chs. 453, 454; Laws 1939, chs. 397, 419;,.awvs 1941, chs. 435, 537, 538.
Practice, at least recently, has been for interested senators and representatives to introduce individual claims bills.. Claims which the appropriate
committees have considered meritorious have then been consolidated into a
single bill. Highway claims now are handled through one or two separate
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At best this political remedy is an uncertain method of redress.
An injured person must convince his own senator or representative, or some other one who can be induced to interest himself
in the claim, that his claim is a meritorious one. If lie fails in
this initial step, he has no remedy at all. Even if he succeeds here
he faces the much more difficult task of demonstrating the soundness of his claim to the committee members, then to the whole
senate and house. Obviously with other committee assignments
demanding the legislators' attention, claims cannot get a full,
impartial hearing; and political influence must play an important
part in the outcome. Many meritorious claims go unrecompensed,
and some of more dubious merit are paid. Even the authorization by the legislature is not enough, for many of the claims
authorized fail to meet the approval of the attorney general or
fail to satisfy other requirements set out in the claims acts for
their passage.90 5
2.

ACTS WAIVING GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY

FROM

Sur

With the increasing number and complexity of claims, the
legislature has found it more and more difficult to give adequate
consideration to claims against the state based on tortious acts or
omissions of its officers. One way in which this difficulty might
be avoided is by imposing on a regular trial court the duty of
determining the facts giving rise to the claim. A court is obviously
better equipped and better trained to do this job than a legislature whose entire regular deliberations are confined to a period
of ninety legislative days each biennium.
Extremely jealous of the state's immunity, the legislature
only recently has taken any steps to break it down, even in parcommittee bills and miscellaneous claims through another. It has been held
that claims arising out of alleged negligence in the maintenance of trunk
highways cannot constitutionally be made payable from the trunk highway
fund. State ex rel. Wharton v. Babcock, (1930) 181 Minn. 409, 232 N. W.
718.
90
lnformation from the highway department confirms this statement.
In only one case since 1927 have all the claims covered by a highway
claims act actually been paid. That case is Minnesota, Laws 1939, cl.
397. In recent years the legislature has divided the highway claims between two bills, placing in one bill only those about which there was
no question of the state's responsibility and in the other all claims of dubious merit. Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 397 was one of the former. On
the other hand none of the claims specified in some claims acts has ever
been paid. Minnesota, Laws 1927, ch. 384 is an example. See on this general
subject, Nutting, Legislative Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against the
State, (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
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ticular cases. Apparently not until 1935 did the legislature authorize the determination of tort claims against the state through
judicial channels. Laws of 1935, ch. 308, in the ortho.dox fashion
of claims acts, authorizes the payment of a maximum amount in
settlement of -twelve claims, of which ten may properly be regarded
as sounding in tort. But Section 13 of the act was novel. ,It reads,
"The foregoing claims have been allowed for the purpose of
permitting the claimants to contest their rights in the courts, if
any they have, as the wrongs or alleged wrongs to property of the
claimants were of such complicated character that the committees
of the legislature felt that they could not hear them properly on
the facts and the purpose of making the allowance is only to give
the claimants the right to have their injuries, if any they have
sustained, entitling them to a day in court and the amounts allowed are in no way to be considered by the courts as an adjudication of the claim, insofar as the amount is concerned."9 00
Another act 90 7 passed the same day followed this pattern. It
authorized suit on a number of claims, about ten of which may
be considered as being based on an alleged tortious act or omission. It .also fixed maximum amounts which were not to be construed
"as involving the sums of money that should actually be paid,
but have been put into the various sections of this bill for the
purpose of giving the claimants a chance to have a day in court
where the claims can be adjudicated in the usual way as a matter
of law."908
It is impossible, of course, to tell how the results achieved
through an adjudication "in the usual way as a matter of law"
compare with those that the legislature might have achieved had
it made the decision upon the claims itself. At any rate, only four
of the claims included in the first act were ever paid and only
nineteen of the second.

90 9

The precedents established in 1935 were followed in 1937,010
90 Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 384 amended this section to exempt one
claim, a claim for Douglas County for the benefit of the city of Alexandria,
from the provisions of this section. Payment of this claim was authorized
by another
1937 act. Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 454.
90 Minnesota, Laws 1935, ch. 309.
9os8Minnesota, Laws 1935, ch. 309, sec. 20.
9-9Information secured from the department of highways, December 4,
1941. The proportion actually paid does not differ markedly from that

arrived at by comparing the number of claims authorized to be paid under

more orthodox claims acts and the number actually paid. In both these
cases, not all the claims actually paid were settled for the full amount
authorized.
P'OMinnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 480, as amended by Laws 1939, ch. 113.
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in 1939,911 and again in 1941.912 All these later acts authorized
suit within six months'oLpassage and permitted the commissioner
of highways to "pay, "compromise, adjust or settle" any of the
claims within the maximums stated in the acts. An attempt was
made in the 1941 legislature to provide a general waiver of
immunity so that claimants generally could bring action against
the state ;913 but this bill, on which no progress was made, did not

extend to tort claims.
Until recently, the effect of these statutes waiving the state's
immunity from suit has been in doubt. Some other courts had
held that by these laws, the legislature waived only immunity from

being sued and in no way created or admitted a liability where
none existed before. 914 This attitude is typical of the strictness
with which courts have construed statutes passed in derogation
of common law immunity, and squares with our own court's
attitude toward the Minnesota statute making school districts
liable "for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from
some act or omission of such board." 911 Other courts, however,
particularly more recently, have given the statutes a broader construction and have held that these special acts waive immunity
from liability as well as from suit. 910
The Minnesota court, in a recent decision construing Laws
1939, ch. 420, has joined the latter group of courts. 9 17 Stating that
9"Minnesota, Laws 1939, chs. 396, 420. All the claims included in
Laws 1939, ch. 396 grew out of the construction of a single bridge, but
the legislature said in its preamble that "the number and nature of such
claims is such that it is impracticable for the Legislature to determine the
merits thereof." Information from the department of highways indicates
that all of these claims except two have been paid at a small fraction of
the total authorized. Test cases were brought on two of the items bt
the claimants
lost.
912
Minnesota, Laws 1941, chs. 456, 539.
913H.F.
440, S.F. 404.
914
Brooks v. State, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 534:
Apfelbacher v. State, (1915) 160 Wis. 565, 152 N. W. 144; Smith v.
State, (1920) 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841.
9151 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 3098. The statute can be traced
back to Revised Statutes of 1851, ch. 79, sees. 12, 15. The Minnesota court
has consistently held that the statute does not operate to change the rule
regarding nonliability for torts committed in the exercise of governmental
functions. Banks v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51
N. W. 814; Allen v. Independent School District No. 17, (1927) 173 Minn.
5, 216 N. W. 533; Mokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, (1929)
177 Minn. 446, 225 N. W. 292; Bang v. Independent School District No. 27,
(1929) 177 Minn. 454, 225 N. W. 449; cf. Zins v. Justus, (Minn. 1941)
299 N. W. 685; Holzworth v. State, (Wis. 1941) 298 N. W. 163.
9-6Pennington's Admr. v. Commonwealth, (1932) 242 Ky. 527. 46
S. W. (2d) 1079; Sirrine v. State, (1925) 132 S. C. 241, 128 S. 7. 172:
comment, (1939) 25 Va. L. Rev. 473, 477.
q1l;Westerson v. State, (1940) 207 Minn. 412. 291 N. W. 900.
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a claim statute such as that under discussion may recognize legal
obligations and may compensate by direct appropriation or may
waive immunity from suit,918 the court concluded that if the
latter method is employed the legislature might prescribe such
terms and conditions for recovery as it deems appropriate. Since
the complaint was responsive to those terms and conditions, liability, the court felt, should follow. On the question of whether
anything more than an immunity to sue was waived, the court
added,
"We think it is apparent that the legislature intended to compensate for injury done by waiving its sovereign immunity to
suit. To hold otherwise would virtually give plaintiff a mere
right to sue but leave him with only a non-existent cause. Such a
construction would amount to a total destruction of the obvious
beneficent purpose of the act. The trial judge aptly said: 'It
should not be assumed that the legislature intended that the
claimants named were to be put to the expense of instituting and
maintaining actions, nor the county and state to the expense
incident to the conduct and trial of such actions . . . if it did not
intend that the state should be held liable for damages.' "00
The state relied upon the principle that a governmental agency
is not answerable for damages sustained as the result of the
negligence of its officers or agents in the performance of governmental functions. However, the case in issue involved damages
from a diversion of surface water, which, as the court pointed
out, came within the exception that "towns and counties charged
with highway construction and maintenance are liable in damages
to property owners if and when the owners' property rights are
invaded." 920 The case cannot be considered, therefore, as final
authority upon the question of the effect of the immunity waiver in
cases of negligent injury to persons or personal property rather
than to abutting real property. 2' The fact that quasi municipal
corporations are not liable for negligence in the discharge of
governmental functions even though they may be sued suggests
that the state's immunity from suit is not necessarily the only
918
The court cited State ex rel. Wharton v. Babcock, (1930) 181 Minn.
409, 232 N. W. 718, which held that the legislature could not constitutionally authorize payment from the trunk highway fund of claims for damages
due to the negligence of the state in the maintenance of highways.
91gWesterson v. State, (1940) 207 Minn. 412, 416, 291 N. W. 900.
920(1940) 207 Minn. 412, 291 N. W. 900, 902.
921A few of the former injuries have been included in the acts waiving

immunity from suit. Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 420, for example, contained one claim for damages from negligent spreading of calcium chloride
as a result of which some milk cows were poisoned and died, and another
item of damages for personal injuries and property damaged by negligent

construction and maintenance of a trunk highway.
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bar to liability of the state for personal injuries resulting from its
defective highway maintenance. On the other hand, the argument
of Westerson v. State indicates that a waiver of immunity from
suit might carry with it a waiver of immunity from liability in
such cases as well as in the type of action involved in that case.
In states where the question of what is special legislation is one
for final judicial determination, special acts waiving state immunity from tort liability have been held unconstitutional when
they have been attacked as having been passed where a general
law could be made applicable 2 " However, the laws that have
been passed in Minnesota to waive the state's immunity from
suit in particular cases can hardly be considered invalid as special
legislation. Claims acts or special acts waiving the state's immunity
are not included among the kinds of special acts specifically prohibited by the Minnesota constitution;23 and at least the former
necessarily must be special. 24
Laws authorizing suits against the state have as yet carved
out only a small segment of the possible field of state liability it]
tort.121 Immunity has been waived only where the claims have
involved complicated situations or otherwise have arisen out of
peculiar circumstances. Yet these few acts may be of considerable
significance, for they manifest, in some cases even in express ]anguage. a legislative recognition that at least in the limited field
covered by them, the law-making body is in no position to pass
intelligently and adequately upon the claims involved. Theoreticallv. there is no reason why the principle of these acts should not
be extended by opening the courts to any individual who has a
2

92 Jack v. State, (1937)
183 Okla. 375, 82 P. (2d) 1033; Sirrine v.
State, (1925) 132 S. C. 241, 128 S. E. 172.
923Minn. const. art. 4, sec. 33. This section begins by forbidding a
special law "in all cases when a general law can be made applicable." but
this general clause has not been used to invalidate laws as special if the
law could not be invalidated as infringing the specific prohibitions which
follow. Consult Anderson. Special Legislation in Minnesota. (1923)
7
MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 133-151, 187-207.

.24See

Dike v. State. (1888) 38 Minn. 366. 38 N. W. 95. which held

that a statute which singles out a particular claimant and allows him to
establish his claim on appealing from the findings of a claims commission
to the district court, although other claimants do not have this right, is
constitutional. The court pointed out that appropriation acts necessarily

cannot25 be general.

9 In Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 480, the state waived immunity from
suit "for any injuries, for personal injuries and property damaged, caused by

the location, construction, reconstruction, improvement and maintenance of

the trunk highway system." The court has held, however, that this waiver
does not extend to claims other than those enumerated in the following sections of the Act. Underhill v. State, (1940) 208 Minn. 498, 294 N. W. 643.
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claim against the state; but such a departure from precedent is
92
not yet on the horizon. 1
3.

MoB AND RioT AcTs

At common law one whose property or person was injured
by acts of mobs or rioters had no recourse for the damage against
the state or the political subdivision in which it occurred. This
was treated merely as a lapse of a governmental duty for which
no liability could be imposed.9 27 However, legislation now exists
in about half the states giving the injured persons redress against
municipal corporations or quasi municipal corporations for damages to person, property, or both.9 28 Minnesota is among these
states, but its statute is not extensive in its effect. 929 It is limited to
damages for lynching, defined by the act as the killing of a
human being by the act or procurement of a mob.93 0 The county in
which a lynching occurs is made liable to the dependents of the
person lynched in an amount up to $7,500, recoverable in a civil
action. As is generally true of statutes of this kind, reasonable
care is no defense. The statute, like others throughout the country, appears to be predicated either on the theory that the county
is by implication at fault when a lynching occurs or on the idea
that it is better that the loss be distributed equitably over the
community than that the injured persons should have to bear
the loss alone. It has been said that statutes of this kind "exemplify an advanced theory of public assumption of risk which far
exceeds in social significance any thing to be found in tort
liability for official wrongdoing." 9 1' In Minnesota, however, the
926It has taken place, however, in New York through the court of
claims act. N. Y. Laws 1929, ch. 467, Court of Claims Act, sec. 12-a. Cf.
recent Michigan statutes allowing claims for injuries caused by negligence
in the construction, improvement or maintenance of any trunk line highway.
Michigan, Acts 1925, no. 374, p. 736; Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 238.
927Gianfortone v. City of New Orleans, (E.D. La. 1894) 61 Fed. 64:
Campbell v. City of Montgomery, (1875) 53 Ala. 527; Prather v. City of
Lexington, (1852)

52 Ky. 559; Western College v. Cleveland, (1861)

12

Ohio 375; see Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 16336n.;
6 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), sec. 2821.
92 8
Liability of the Municipality for Mob Violence, (1937) 6 Ford.

L.

Rev. 270-283; Communal Liability for Mob Violence, (1936) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1362-1369. Both these articles cite all the existing statutes of the
various states.
9292 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 10036-10037. An effort to extend
this liability was made in the 1941 legislature but the bill, H.F. 936, failed
of passage after being approved by the house of representatives.
930Idem, sec. 10036.
93'Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in

Tort, (1936) 2 Legal Notes on Local Government, 89, 97.
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statute in its restricted form may never have been used; at least
it appears never to have been construed by the courts.
4.

MOTOR VEHICLE OWNER'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY STATUTE

Minnesota, in line with a number of other states, has passed
a statute 932 making the owner of a motor vehicle liable for the
negligence of one who uses the automobile with his consent. In
at least one state, such an act has been held to apply to municipal
corporations and to make them liable for the acts of a policeman
where otherwise, according to well-settled principles, the city
would be immune. 33 In Minnesota, however, a specific exception
has been made so that the statute evidently does not extend the
liability of municipal or quasi municipal corporations in the case
of motor vehicle torts.

5.

THE

934

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACT

Before the passage of the workmen's compensation act, the
master generally was liable for injuries to his servant in the course
of his employment only when the injuries were tortious; and the
questions whether the master was negligent and the servant was
not, and whether the servant assumed the risk of the particular
injury usually had a significant bearing on the master's liabilitV.

13 5

These same principles had been applied in a number of

cases to injuries to municipal as well as private employees 9 8
Municipalities were held liable only in case their tortious acts or
omissions resulted in the injury; and, indeed, there is evidence
that even here, as in the case of injuries to third persons, the fact
9323 Mason's
1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 2720-104. This is
part of the safety responsibility act, Laws 1933, ch. 351.
933 Kelly v. Niagara Falls, (1928) 131 Misc. Rep. 934. 229 N.Y.S. 328.
Cf. Irolla v. City of New York, (1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 908, 280 N. Y. S. 873;
Downing v. City of New York, (1927) 219 N. Y. S. 444, 220 N. Y. S. 76.
affd. 245 N. Y. 597, 157 N. E. 873.
934The word "person" as used in the act is defined to exclude the
state and its political subdivisions. 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp.,
sec. 2720-101. As to the construction of such statutes generally, consult
a note in (1937) 21 MININESOTA LAv REVIEW 823.
93
5See cases cited in 4 Dunnell's Minn. Digest, (1927) sees. 5833,
5855, 5964, 5999.
936
See, for example, Friedrich v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 68 Minn.
402, 71 N. W. 387; Hughley v. City of Wabasha, (1897) 69 Minn. 245.
72 N. W. 78; Stahl v. City of Duluth, (1898) 71 Minn. 341, 74 N. W. 143;
Gilbert v. City of Tracy, (1911) 115 Minn. 443, 132 N. W. 752; Sivertson
v. City of Moorhead, (1912) 119 Minn. 467, 138 N. W. 674: Jones v.
City of St. Paul, (1915) 130 Minn. 260, 153 N. W. 516.
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that the municipality was engaged in a governmental function was
a good defense. 37
Under the workmen's compensation act, however, questions
of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and
other common law defenses are not material in determining liability. 938 Consequently the responsibility of the employer may be
considered as not sounding in tort; at any rate, his liability may be
quite without fault. The subject of liability of municipalities
under the workmen's compensation act is therefore treated as
beyond the scope of this study.
One interesting problem of municipal liability under the workmen's compensation act has developed recently in connection with
municipal sponsorship of work relief projects. 939 Only two cases
involving a situation of this kind have reached the supreme court.
In Michels v. City of St. Pa-z194 a city was held liable for injuries
suffered by a worker on a CWA project where the city had by
written agreement assumed the liability imposed by law."'
In Bushnell v. City of Dzduth,942 the city was held liable under
the workmen's compensation act for injuries to a truck driver
who was working under direction of a W. P. A. foreman on a
boulevard improvement project. The only question involved was
whether the injury occurred while the driver was sufficiently
under the control and management of the W. P. A. foreman to
charge the city with liability under the workmen's compensation
act. The driver was substituting for his brother at the time the
accident occurred. Recent cases elsewhere have been divided.
The result has depended generally on the determination of fact
questions surrounding the relationship between the parties, liability being imposed where the worker could be found to be the
employee of the municipality either for all purposes or for the
particular transaction under the borrowed servant doctrine.""
(To be Concluded)
93
7See Bang v. Independent School District No. 27, (1929)
177 Minn.
454, 225 N. W. 449.
9381 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., secs. 4272-1, 4272-3.
939
Tort liability for injury to third persons due to relief projects has
been discussed earlier. See (1942) 26 2MINESOTA LAw REviEw 308.
940(1935)
193 Minn. 215, 258 N. W. 162.
941
The city's contention that it had assumed only the liability imposed
by law and that such liability did not exist in such cases in Minnesota

where there was no employer-employee relationship was not discussed by
the court.

942(1940) 209 Minn. 27, 295 N. V. 73.
3

94 See cases cited in note, (1938) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 264. and
annotation in 120 A. L. R. 1148; cf. Hanson v. St. James Hotel and Union
City Mission, (1934) 191 'Minn. 315, 254 N. W. 4.

